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DOING BUSINESS: THE MANAGEMENT OF
UNCERTAINTY IN LAWYERS' WORK
JOHN FLOOD
Apparently naive, but in fact not, is the question: What do lawyers
do? Many scholars assume the central role of the lawyer is that of
the advocate, but among lawyers working in law firms advocacy con-
sumes little of their time. Similarly, the term lawyer provides hardly
any meaning in itself. The research presented here is based on a par-
ticipant-observation study of a corporate law firm. The central thesis
proposed, in the light of case studies of the selling of shopping mall
and the arranging of a bank loan, is that business lawyers are en-
gaged in managing uncertainty for both their clients and themselves.
Managing uncertainty is accomplished through interaction rather




"I'm a labor lawyer-management."
If one were to ask a lawyer what he or she does, these might
be some of the answers elicited. In themselves they are hardly in-
formative. An insider would understand the terminology, but
there are degrees of "insiderness" and understanding would not be
uniform across all degrees. Heinz and Laumann (1982) have sug-
gested that a criminal defense lawyer, for example, would fail to
comprehend the arcana of the corporate lawyer's interest-rate
swaps, and similarly the corporate lawyer would have difficulty
understanding the intricacies of a plea bargain or a death penalty
appeal. At the general rhetorical level, the problem poses an issue
basic to much work on the legal profession, namely, the problem of
what lawyers do (cf. Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941; Abel 1980; Abel
and Lewis 1989). Why does the noun lawyer not take a verb that
Earlier versions of this article benefited from the advice of others. I
would like to thank especially Douglas Maynard, who gave me several pages of
extremely pertinent comments, and Jack Katz, who has given my work gener-
ous readings. Others I would like to thank for their comments are Jack Heinz,
Bill Hicks, Jeff Kennedy, Hans Micklitz and Eleni Skordaki. Shari Diamond
and the two anonymous reviewers were very thorough as was Bette Sikes's ex-
acting editing.
1 ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, a complex
statute governing the funding and administration of pension plans.
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connotes a set of cognate activities to the same degree as other
naming nouns? It is intuitively simple to understand painters
painting, auditors auditing, doctors doctoring, nurses nursing, and
ministers ministering-the dictionaries carry them all-but law-
yers lawyering carries no or little semantic sense compared to the
others. Indeed, the verb "to lawyer" is a neologism; both the Ox-
ford English Dictionary and Webster's Third New International
Dictionary carry no entries for this word as a verb, but they do for
every one of the others.2 One solution is to examine lawyers' ac-
tual work practices in a systematic and closely textured way (May-
nard 1984). Because few studies of lawyers have been carried out
from within the firm setting, the current stock of knowledge about
lawyers' work and their relationships with clients is at best partial
(Mann 1985; Sarat and Felstiner 1986; but cf. Danet et al. 1980).
Furthermore, the difficulty of the enterprise is compounded be-
cause the authority of lawyers depends on factors other than their
knowledge base (cf. Jamous and Peloille 1970; Schon 1983; Horobin
1983; Parsons 1954). Their work, as I shall show, covers areas of
advising that are intuitively more within the boundaries of busi-
ness practice than law (Dezalay 1990). 3
Ultimately, these theoretical concerns about professional
work-what people do--are dependent on the nature of the inter-
actions that form the infrastructure of the relationship between
professional and client (Hughes 1958). Hughes (1971:304) put it
thus:
The division of labor, in its turn, implies interaction; for it
consists not in the sheer difference of one man's kind of
work from that of another, but in the fact that the differ-
ent tasks and accomplishments are parts of a whole whose
product all, in some degree, contribute to. And wholes, in
the human social realm as in the rest of the biological and
the physical realm, have their essence in interaction.
Work as social interaction is the central theme of sociologi-
cal and social psychological study of work.
Schon (1983) argues an analogous position that the conven-
tional model of professionals as "technically rational" problem
solvers is insufficient to describe and explain the methods profes-
sionals use. For him "doing-in-action" and "knowledge-in-action"
are far more powerful explanatory concepts. That is, to under-
stand professionals' work, we must describe and analyze what they
do, that is, concentrate on the interactions m* their work.
In this article I will argue that the central role business law-
yers play is in managing uncertainty both for themselves and for
2 Interestingly, one finds the idea of practice entering as a descriptor for
professionals, e.g., she practices law. The term carries the connotation of im-
provement through doing. The Oxford Dictionary of Concise English defines
the verb to practice as "do repeatedly as exercise to improve skill."
3 This raises the further question of what exactly it is that distinguishes
lawyers from other professionals (Abbott 1988).
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their clients. By business lawyers, I mean those who classify
themselves as office lawyers rather than as litigators and who gen-
erally work in large law firms.
4
I derive my notion of uncertainty management from the eth-
nography of Renee Fox, the medical sociologist (1957, 1959; see
also Parsons 1952), and Donald Schon (1983). Fox articulates two
types of uncertainty: that of incomplete grasp of knowledge and
that based on the limits of current knowledge. From them, she de-
rives a third type, that caused by inability of actors to distinguish
between the first two (1957:208-9). Her presentation of the uncer-
tainty variable arises in the context of doctors' training and the
ways they begin to recognize and acknowledge its existence. Fox
intertwines uncertainty into the training trajectory: "With the
growth of [the student's] knowledge and skill ... and the widening
and deepening of his experience, a student's perspective on his
own uncertainty changes" (ibid., p. 219). Describing the student's
awe at the amount of knowledge that must be absorbed early in
the training, Fox says that by the student's third year a change in
manner occurs. "He ... adopts a manner of certitude, for he has
come to realize that it may be important for him to 'act like a sa-
vant' even when he does not actually feel sure" (ibid., p. 227). This
manner is, however, short-lived because in the fourth year the stu-
dent is given sole responsibility for patients; uncertainty intrudes
sharply. One of Fox's student-subjects summarizes his feelings
this way: "Experience makes you less sure of yourself .... Instead
of looking for the day when all the knowledge you need will be in
your possession, you learn that such a day will never come" (ibid.,
p. 228). And so the doctors-to-be realize that feelings of uncer-
tainty will never depart, but at least they are made aware of this
phenomenon.
Like Fox's tyro doctors, would-be lawyers are introduced to
the notions of uncertainty during their professional school train-
ing. Their texts are no longer comprehensive and inclusive,
designed to facilitate the student's acquisition of knowledge step
by step as most college texts do, but rather apparently random and
chaotic collections of disjointed materials with little or no connec-
tive narrative (cf. D'Amato 1987; Schlegel 1989). This does not
mean, however, that lawyers are necessarily fully imbued with the
values of uncertainty in law school. Nevertheless, uncertainty is
controlled, for the approach of law school is basically theoretical,5
more concerned with appellate judicial decisionmaking, than the
4 For those unfamiliar with the structure of the U.S. legal profession,
lawyers are admitted by their individual states as attorneys which allows them
to practice as both advocates and office lawyers. The basic requirements for
admission by a state are the possession of undergraduate and law school de-
grees.
5 By theoretical I do not necessarily mean that law is a body of scientific
theory, but rather that it is a discipline based on book knowledge as opposed to
craft skills.
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situations students face after graduation when the real world of
practice pitches them into the maw of uncertainty where the court
is rarely invoked, and where solutions are not always found but
often created. Indeed, the tension between the search for a "right
answer" which seems implicit in such law teaching and the notions
of indeterminacy which are easily inferred from the substance of
the cases infuses much of the law school experience with a kind of
ambivalence about uncertainty. One could argue that medicine, by
virtue of its continuing ties to the hospital-during training and af-
terwards in practice-smooths the entry of its students into prac-
tice. The training commingles theory and practice. Doctors never
sever the connection between their training institutions and their
places of work because they are often the same. Law schools en-
tirely lack this capacity: they are not functional equivalents of the
hospital and they are not conspicuously successful in mixing ele-
ments of theory and practice (Stevens 1983). Whereas they raise
the issues of uncertainty for their students, this is not a theme that
recurs in the law school experience. It is the move into practice
which prompts the thought that "experience makes you less cer-
tain of yourself."
The uncertainty of practice functions at more than one level.
Each type of uncertainty is contingent on the situation. For my
purposes there are three main types of uncertainty ranging in de-
gree from high to low risk, plus a fourth kind of uncertainty that
is ancillary to the other three:
1. Where the lawyer is not handling law per se or tightly
specified sets of facts. Instead, the situation is fluid, open
and constantly changing. The lawyer must rely on experi-
ential skills rather than "book learning." A typical exam-
ple is a business negotiation,6 as will be discussed in the
first two cases below.
2. Where the lawyer is ignorant of the law on the topic. The
second example in the section on "snow jobs" is an in-
stance of this type: Faking knowledge is necessary to reas-
sure the client and to preserve the lawyer from exposure.
3. Where the lawyer needs to buy time in order to arrive at a
satisfactory answer, e.g., the partner wanting to check the
law on polygraph tests in the first example of snow jobs or
the partner trying to discover what a fetter of guarantee is.
4. Where the lawyer is subject to the politics of the law firm.
If the first two types of uncertainty were exposed to clients,
they would cause embarrassment to the lawyer, raising the ques-
tion of what the lawyer is supposed to be doing for clients. The
amount of uncertainty felt is also a function of the status of the
6 Of course, elements of negotiation can be taught and learned, but not
every lawyer acquires such skills either in law school or afterwards (see Fisher
and Ury 1981).
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lawyer. It is potentially more embarrassing for a partner than for
a first-year associate to display ignorance. Articulating the third
type of uncertainty to the client brings a positive benefit, as it dis-
plays the lawyer's concern for the client's welfare and justifies re-
search and billing. Instead of possessing negative features, this
type of uncertainty could be positively displayed to the client, but
it has to be done with care. It connotes an insurance policy by the
lawyer against future risk.7 Another way of putting this is to view
the first two types as ways of preserving the state of the lawyer's
ego and the third type as focused on the client. The lawyer pre-
serves harmony within her immediate community and herself and
does not alarm the client.
H. DATA AND METHODS
My data are drawn from an ethnographic study of an elite cor-
porate law firm in Chicago, which I call Tischmann Weinstock and
Levine.8 I will first present a brief picture of the social structure
and work of the firm and then explain how the research was done.
The firm is composed of about eighty lawyers who practice in
several fields, among them, tax, real estate, business, estate plan-
ning, and litigation. Tischmann considers itself a general practice
firm. Within Tischmann the largest practice areas are real estate,
litigation, and corporate, all of comparable size. The next largest
practice group is estate planning.
The lawyers are evenly divided in number between partners
and associates. Tischmann has a policy of maintaining a one-to-one
partner-to-associate ratio, an inducement it uses to counteract the
lure of the megafirms to potential associates. Using the ranking
system of law schools devised by Heinz and Laumann (1982), I
found that 50 percent of the firm's lawyers graduated from elite
law schools (Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Michigan), about one-quarter
from prestige law schools (Northwestern, Duke), and about 10 per-
cent each from regional schools (Illinois, Iowa, Notre Dame, Wis-
consin) and from local schools (Chicago-Kent, Loyola, De Paul).
The range of the billing rates, at the time of the research, was
from $70 to $225 with a median of $115.
The firm's clients ranged from large multimillion-dollar com-
panies to wealthy individuals with large estate planning and corpo-
rate needs. The majority of the corporate clients were controlled
by five of the partners. By controlling the major clients, these five
partners were thus able to exercise considerable authority in the
firm.9
7 Kagan and Rosen (1985:404) refer to one of the images of the corporate
lawyer's role as the "Insurer."
8 The law firm's name is a pseudonym. I have changed a few details in
my description of the firm to make it harder to identify, but these changes do
not affect the analysis.
9 For further on the structure and work of Tischmann see Flood (1987).
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I observed, interviewed, and participated in the firm over a pe-
riod of about twelve months. This bland statement hides an elabo-
rate set of negotiations between a number of law firms and myself
as to how I would observe lawyers at work.10 One of my advisers,
a notable in the Chicago legal community, put me in contact with a
partner at Tischmann. I discussed my plans with him for observ-
ing lawyers' working and the everyday routines of the law firm.
Because I am English, a comparative element was often introduced
into these discussions (e.g., "What are law firms like in England?
What is the difference between barristers and solicitors?") This
element, in my opinion, helped the negotiations and certainly pro-
vided a basis for my perceived ignorance of U.S. law practice (cf.
Danet et al. 1980). I was granted access by the Tischmann partner-
ship to enter the firm for one year as a part-time associate. In
making me an associate the partners were protecting the firm
from any charges of breaching the lawyer-client privilege of confi-
dentiality (cf. Felstiner and Sarat 1984). Their primary concern
was for their clients; the partner with whom I negotiated my entry
was not overly concerned if I identified the law firm. Neverthe-
less, I have been careful to hide its identity.
I began my period at Tischmann by working on two cases han-
dled by the partner who negotiated my entry. This method had
the benefit of plugging me into the lawyers' information network
in the firm. I attended in-house seminars on litigation and other
topics and gradually came to know what matters other lawyers
were working on. My aim was to gain experience of all the fields
of practice either directly, by working on cases, or indirectly, by
observing matters. I did not apply systematic criteria for selecting
cases; that is, I did not specify the types of cases I would observe.
Rather, as I heard of matters through the informal information
networks, I would ask to participate in some way. At other times
lawyers would come to me and say they had an interesting case
that I might like to see. One basic distinction I came to make was
between cases involving some form of dispute resolution and those
that were facilitative in nature (i.e., putting deals together).
Because of the way a law firm such as Tischmann operates,
the social scientist is unable to plan precisely how to approach the
functioning of the organization. I was committed, taking my lead
from Hughes, to observing the firm in its natural day-to-day rou-
tines and perceiving how the members of the firm organized these
routines as a set of accomplishments (Schegloff 1986). Thus, as
Sarat and Felstiner (1986) also note, my cases were not randomly
selected. Nor did I necessarily cover cases from start to finish;
given that a lawyer's work generally involves dealing with several
cases simultaneously, extensive gaps in cases' developments are in-
10 For complete details of the biography of the research project see Flood
(1987).
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evitable. A lawyer may draft an agreement, but the other party's
lawyer may not respond for several weeks. I too therefore was
forced to dip in and out of cases. I observed and participated in
cases from all practice fields in Tischmann. Over the course of the
twelve months I collected data on just over a hundred cases. But I
should add here that cases were not the sole form of data I was
interested in; much of my time was also taken up with observing
the interactions of the lawyers among themselves, which provided
me with insight into how the firm held together. The context
within which they functioned was as important as what they actu-
ally did (Goffman 1964; Flood 1987). The form of the interactions
was highly varied: formal meetings between lawyers and clients;
formal meetings between groups of lawyers; court and other quasi-
judicial hearings; informal discussions among lawyers from the
firm and among lawyers from different firms; informal discussions
between lawyers and clients; and, on occasion, discussions among
clients about their lawyers. One important source of information
was the telephone calls the lawyers made and received. If I hap-
pened to be sitting in a lawyer's office when the telephone rang
and it was not a personal call, I usually remained. Fortunately for
me lawyers like to make notes when they are talking on the
phone, which means that they need to keep their hands free, so
often they would use the "squawk box," the loudspeaker attached
to the phone. In this way I could hear both sides of the conversa-
tion. And since everyone was taking notes on their yellow legal
pads, so did I."
I was given free access to the file room, and I also examined
case files. The files varied in quality. Some were haphazard col-
lections of paper with no easily recognizable form; others were
highly organized and intensively indexed. Transactions of the type
described below-selling a shopping mall--occupied the latter cat-
egory. They told the story of detailed planning, the coping with
"blue sky laws," etc. The less detailed files often reflected a par-
ticular lawyer's degree of interest in a case. I used the files as a
contextual device to inform the content of the interactions I ob-
served. Similarly, I used my own discussions with lawyers as a
means of supplementing my observations. Most of these "inter-
views" were of an informal nature (cf. Flood 1983).
I was, however, excluded from certain situations. I did not at-
tend the partnership meetings, although their contents rarely
stayed private long: in such a relatively small environment it was
difficult to keep information in closed circuits. Gossip was inevita-
ble (cf. March and Sevon 1988:432). Another situation of exclusion
was the occasion when a partner in another law firm came to con-
11 Unlike Sarat and Felstiner (1986) I never used a tape recorder, consid-
ering it inappropriate in the context of my work. Instead I took very detailed
notes, often taking down virtually entire conversations.
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sult the lawyer with whom I happened to be working at that time.
The lawyer-client adamantly refused to have me present. I was
never told that I could not attend any other meetings, but I am un-
able to specify the extent to which I was excluded by omission, by
simply not being informed of such and such a meeting taking
place. Of course, if meetings were held in another city or country,
it was unlikely I would be invited to attend.
The main resource used in this article is lawyers' talk. Corpo-
rate lawyers spend roughly 55 percent of their chargeable time in
some form of talk with others (Flood 1987). Those others are a
mixture of other lawyers, clients, colleagues, and helpers. Unlike
"L.A. Law," real elite lawyers do not spend much time in court.
Their time is taken up in the office or conference rooms where
they counsel clients, negotiate with other lawyers, cut deals, draft
letters, review documents, and fill in time sheets describing their
billable work. Talk, then, is vital to lawyers: It is through recur-
ring talk that they constitute their worlds, organizations, and cre-
ate their identities. Talk is their business (Boden, forthcoming).
In the following sections, I consider some examples of putting
deals together and giving advice. I selected these particular exam-
ples because they show the ways work is done by lawyers, either
collectively or individually. The substance of the examples is typi-
cal of the sorts of matters handled by corporate lawyers.
III. DOING BUSINESS: THE ROLE OF BUSINESS LAWYERS
Business lawyers carry out a large range of tasks: arranging
loan agreements with banks, engaging in international business,
incorporating companies, preparing securities' issues, negotiating
the purchase of shopping malls. All these can be boiled down to
essentially three tasks: advising, negotiating, and dra-fting docu-
ments. These three tasks are not necessarily neatly sequentially
ordered. They are interactive. As the client begins to make vari-
ous objectives clearer to the lawyer, the lawyer can begin to frame
them in the appropriate language (Cain 1983). But then as the
framing takes place, the objectives may begin to shift and further
advice and negotiation is required. For example, a client may need
capital to expand a business. If he needs advice, then one of the
array of advisers a businessman may turn to is a corporate lawyer.
Depending on the degree of expertise of the client and the degree
of intimacy with the lawyer, a client may ask for advice on
whether to borrow, how to go about it, the best means of raising
money or which bank to use. Such questions are not always sim-
ple, however, as the means of raising money is closely related to
the uses to which it will be put.
In Tischmann Weinstock and Levine, great emphasis was
placed on establishing and maintaining strong ties, and hence trust
(e.g., Shapiro 1988), with clients. Some of the senior partners had
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almost avuncular relationships with their clients, and clients
would call for advice on all sorts of matters. For example, one of
the senior rainmakers frequently gave advice to clients on how to
act in the stock market. A client called asking if he should sell his
block of 24,000 shares in General Foods to Philip Morris during a
takeover war, even though the price was still rising. The lawyer
told him to sell now, at $118 per share, rather than wait for $120
"because the deal is going through and any increments [on the
share price] would be small. If you sell now, you will only lose
$48,000; cheap insurance for getting a good price." The client pre-
ferred his lawyer's advice to that of a stockbroker, even though
stereotypically investment advice is not a central part of lawyer's
work.
In the next two sections I take two typical transactions that
corporate lawyers would consider among their normal duties,
namely, the selling of a $30 million shopping mall by a real estate
partnership (the client) to a national bank, and arranging $5 mil-
lion loan from a bank to a client company. The transactions high-
light the contingent nature of routine activities for lawyers, the
uncertainty of dealmaking. They show in a finely grained way
what the actual, instead of textbook, processes of lawyering and
hence contingency management are. They show that much of the
work, while routine and mundane, nonetheless necessitates
methodical accomplishment (Schegloff 1986). They show how law-
yers interact with each other and their clients when constructing a
complex deal.
A. Selling a Shopping Mall
In this example, the Tischmann Weinstock partner, Michael
Shapiro, a middle-ranking partner who graduated from the Uni-
versity of Chicago law school, was only nominally in charge of his
client, Segal Partners, a real estate company, which was actually
the "property" of another senior partner. Shapiro was thus placed
in the position of having to satisfy two constituencies, the client
and his senior partner. In a large or medium-sized firm this is a
normal situation for lawyers below the level of senior partner. All
partners are expected to win and nurture their own clients, but
power and control flow to those who hold the largest, and hence
potentially the most productive, clients. Michael Shapiro practiced
predominantly in the real estate area and worked mainly for Segal
Partners. His mentor in Tischmann was Robert Levi, who brought
Segal Partners to the firm. As this client was one of the firm's
largest, Levi exercised considerable authority in the firm and in-
deed headed the firm's policy committee which managed the firm's
internal affairs, including distribution of partners' annual draws.'
2
Segal Partners's principals dealt primarily with Levi, but in indi-
12 Since Tischnmann Weinstock is a partnership, the partners are the own-
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vidual matters the work was assigned to a middle-ranking partner,
such as Shapiro, who would shepherd the deal through the various
intermediate stages. As much as a partner like Shapiro was in
charge of a matter, he could never forget that he was at best only a
second in command: the client could never be his, at least while
Levi was in the firm. His relationship with the client, therefore,
would always contain an irresolvable tension for him. That is, if
the professional is granted the mantle of expert, how is that exper-
tise to be exercised authoritatively when the professional is placed
in an ambiguous position vis-&-vis the client?
Andrew Segal was a successful and wealthy property devel-
oper.'3 In this particular transaction there were problems which
he tried to overcome by force of his personality. As most property
transactions--especially commercial property-involve legal con-
siderations, Segal was continually dealing with lawyers and was
used to them; he was not awed by them. His two associates at the
meeting played very minor roles to his central one.
The bankers and lawyers who were involved in the buying of
Strawberry Fields were less ambiguously situated in their relation-
ships to each other. Both represented large institutions, both insti-
tutions having maintained a long-term relationship with each
other. Similarly, both sets were of equivalent status. The lawyers
were middle-range partners in their firm, and the bankers were
middle management.
Those involved in the negotiation were as follows:
DICK PARSONS Meganational banker
(B=banker)
RoY PORTER Meganational banker (B)
HAL POSNER Meganational outside counsel
(BL=bank lawyer)
SEYMOUR PERRY Meganational outside counsel
(BL)
ANDREW SEGAL Segal partners senior partner
(D=developer)
JOHN SIMMONDS Segal Partners associate (D)
BIL STANLEY Segal Partners associate (D)
MICHAEL SHAPIRO Tischmann Weinstock partner
(TL =Tischmann lawyer)
PAUL STRAUSS Tischmann Weinstock associate
(TL)
The buying and selling of shopping malls are extremely com-
plex events. In part this is because there are so many parties in-
volved in the transaction-lawyers, accountants, bankers, insur-
ance companies, government agencies, and developers. In one such
acquisition of a mall, a transaction involving a sales price of $43
million, the file had seventeen expandable folders and 116 sub-
ers of the firm and thus do not receive a salary but share a draw from the
firm's profits.
13 Segal had had no legal training.
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folders in it. Thus, these are protracted, complicated deals entail-
ing many labor-hours from the parties and their associates. What
is interesting about the following example is that although the de-
velopment company was selling the Strawberry Fields shopping
mall to Meganational Bank for $30 million, it wanted to retain con-
trol of it for a few years. Such an arrangement was unusual inas-
much as a transfer of property from one party to another gener-
ally entailed the transfer of the property itself and the rights to do
whatever the new owner wished (subject to some covenants and
easements, etc.). So in this example some of the rights that would
usually move to the purchaser were to stay with the seller. The
retention of these rights had a significant influence on the subse-
quent negotiations.
I focus here on an all-day meeting scheduled to settle on a fi-
nal draft of the sales agreement. Prior to the meeting, Segal Part-
ners and Meganational had met a few times to discuss price and
modes of payment. In addition, Segal had two other issues to set-
tle before the deal could be completed; namely, the matter of the
guarantee and delinquent tenants. The original development was
undertaken with a guarantee from Equity Insurance Company. If
the development failed to reach certain profit goals, then Equity
could be in a position to exert control over Strawberry Fields
against Segal Partners's wishes. Segal had been trying to persuade
Equity to give up its rights under the guarantee now the sale was
taking place. Equity was, however, reluctant to do this. Segal had
also met with his lawyers several times to discuss the problem of
tenants who defaulted. He was under an obligation to deliver
Strawberry Fields as a profitable going concern. If the tenants
were escaping their leases and obligations, the profits of the mall
would suffer and consequently the transaction with Meganational.
Neither of these issues had been fully disposed of by the time this
meeting was held. In addition to the normal pressures operating
at the end of a long negotiation process, there was less than a
month to complete the deal before the year's end. If the deal col-
lapsed, Segal Partners would lose certain tax benefits.
The meeting started early in the day in a disjointed way-the
lawyers had laid down no tight agenda-but the real issue of who
was to control the mall and in what ways soon emerged:
HAL POSNER (BL): Who wants to get this thing off the
ground?
SEYMOUR PERRY (BL): Why don't we go through the
purchase agreement?
DICK PARSONS (B): Which copy are we using?
MICHAEL SHAPIRO (TL): I'm using the September 13 copy.
DICK PARSONS (B): Well, I have the latest. Let's have
some copies made.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO (TL): Should we be doing assignment
of benefit interest?
DICK PARSONS (B): Isn't there a statute?
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MICHAEL SHAPIRO (TL): Next point: parcel 3 isn't part of
the transaction.
SEYMOUR PERRY (BL): That'll be part of a separate REA
[Reciprocal Easement Agreement].
MICHAEL SHAPIRO (Th): about the recitals on 1A, you're
not buying the entire marketplace.
DICK PARSONS (B): That's right.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO (TL): We get to see how much square
footage there is at Strawberry Fields? We may be sell-
ing X plus agreements to build others, i.e., a cinema
and Taco Bell. On Taco Bell, if they default and don't
build, we won't put anything there.
JOHN SIMMONDS (D): We're covered through a holdback.
BILL STANLEY (D): We'd find someone else.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO (TL): The parking spaces number isn't
correct. There's more to be done yet. Our site is actu-
ally constructed, but Alpine's [another developer] site
isn't.
BILL STANLEY (D): Size depends on how you measure it:
inside, middle, or outside of the wall. When you're the
landlord, it's outside; when you're the tenant, it's in-
side.
Although this was to be the crucial meeting to discuss major
issues systematically, the participants meander into the discussion
in a random, almost haphazard way with no indication of clear di-
rection. It was surprising that the lawyers had developed no clear
agenda. Points were brought up and dismissed quite rapidly. For
example, the "assignment of benefit interest" question (asked by a
lawyer) was dealt with and dismissed by the reply, "Isn't there a
statute?" (asked by a banker). Other points were started, dropped,
and picked up again in a quasi-abstract manner. When Michael
Shapiro (TL) asked the question about the square footage at
Strawberry Fields, no one replied until four utterances later when
the property company representative, Bill Stanley (D), discoursed
on how measurements were interpreted by different people. After
a few more exchanges along these lines, the participants began to
go through the documents more systematically and tackled larger
issues. One striking feature of this piece of talk is that the protag-
onists were the lawyers. The bankers and real estate representa-
tives hardly said anything. Yet the talk was disorganized. For ex-
ample, there was doubt over which was the correct copy of the
purchase agreement. It was almost as though the lawyers were us-
ing this as a preamble to the serious business, a way of warming
up.
In the next set of exchanges, the real core of the transaction,
how to define control, surfaced vividly. And with it who was to
control development of the deal in the meeting.
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ANDREW SEGAL (D): Next one, E,14 I have a big problem
with. I don't give a damn what a guy's net worth is.
Let me give you an example of a guy who got a Vie de
France franchise. He did very well though he has lim-
ited net worth. Then on another development we
wanted restaurants, so we went to him and told him
we wanted him to run one. We'd finance, but he'd
own it. A good tenant is best.
ROY PORTER (B): Yeah, that's venture capital.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): If you're in real estate that's venture
capital. If it's in then you're worried about it.
RoY PORTER (B): I guess that's our only way of isolating it.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): We get financial statements.
HAL POSNER (BL): When do we get to look at the tenants?
ANDREW SEGAL (D): You want to approve every lease?
SEYMOUR PERRY (BL): Is there another economic test we
could use?
ANDREW SEGAL (D): We're not gambling. We put a tenant
in, he improves the place. The worst that can happen
is that he's in and out in a year. You could make on
turnover, lease it.
RoY PORTER (B): That's not our tenant.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): Why don't we isolate it? Under 3,500
square feet we don't bother, over that you approve the
lease.
SEYMOUR PERRY (BL): We could have a security deposit.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): Not being demanded any more.
SEYMOUR PERRY (BL): Why not restrict it to a three-year
lease with a three-year option?
ANDREW SEGAL (D): That's good.
RoY PORTER (B): Andrew's right; it creates a bit of turno-
ver.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO (TL): OK.
The two sides started the true substance of the meeting by ar-
guing over who should examine prospective tenants.15 Andrew Se-
gal (D) opened in a very aggressive manner by disparaging the
bank's need to examine the financial creditworthiness of every
prospective tenant. He backed up his demand with a success story,
which the bank representative immediately identified as venture
capital, that is, a high-risk investment. Segal then attempted to re-
inforce his story by saying his organization obtained reliable finan-
cial statements. Here he was implying that he did not give away
tenancies without scrutinizing prospective tenants, so the bank
should not need to inspect every lease.
The two sides were trying to determine the point at which the
authority of the manager, Segal Partners, ceded to the owner,
Meganational Bank. The arrangement was that while Megana-
tional was buying the mall, Segal Partners would manage it for the
14 This clause required that potential tenants'-assets be examined.
15 See MacCullum (1967) for an interesting discussion of social control in
the American shopping mall.
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bank. Segal Partners, because, in part, of the guarantee from Eq-
uity Insurance, wanted to extend their control over the leasing ar-
rangements as far as they could. The problem concerned the real
estate company's guarantee of $14 million with Equity Insurance,
which appeared intractable. The guarantee was tied to specific
profit projections that the property company had to meet within a
certain time or else lose control of the mall. The issue was
whether it could meet the projections, since having sold the mall
to the bank, Segal Partners would have no'control over how the
guarantee was paid off. This particular problem had already con-
sumed considerable amounts of the Tischmann lawyers' time. It
was in the choice of tenant that the future of the mall lay-high-
risk, potentially profitable tenants versus low-risk, low-profit ones.
The bank was essentially arguing that conservatism should rule
choices, with the implied possibility that the profits from such a
tenant would be relatively low but secure. Segal Partners wanted
to pursue a riskier, more aggressive approach by putting in less fi-
nancially stable tenants, who nonetheless might generate larger
profits. This difference reflected the difference in organizational
ethos between an established bank and a risk-taking property de-
veloper.
Roy Porter (B) suggested "isolating the economic test," put
forward by the bank lawyer, Seymour Perry, which Segal said
should not be applied below 3,500 square feet. The bank's lawyers
were unable to accept this initial suggestion and offered their al-
ternatives of taking security deposits on anything more than a
three-year lease with a three-year option. Both sides wanted the
deal to go through, but it was the task of Posner and Perry to an-
ticipate the problems and uncertainty that would arise as the deal
was formulated. Here both Porter and Perry moved Segal towards
the formulation of a test that would clarify when a tenant became
the responsibility of the other.
The protagonist in this scene was the property company repre-
sentative, Andrew Segal. The antago-ists were the bankers and
their lawyers. Interestingly, the Tischmann Weinstock partner
played a quite modest, passive role, that of summarizing and con-
cluding the proceedings with the statement "OK." Part of the con-
ventional wisdom of lawyering is the picture of the lawyer exercis-
ing control, dominating the scene. James Stewart's The Partners
(1983) speaks of lawyers as virtual cowboys proving who is fastest
with the writ or interrogatory; everyone else is cast as inferior to
the lawyers. 16 Sarat and Felstiner (1986), in their study of divorce
lawyers, also depicted lawyers as controlling and manipulating
their clients. But here we see more of a dialogue between lawyer
16 In his description of the IBM antitrust suit, Stewart (1983:53-113) not
only depicts the IBM helpers as inferior to the Cravath lawyers, but distin-
guishes between the superiority of private counsel, Cravath lawyers, and the
mediocrity of the government lawyer.
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and client and between lawyer and opposite principal. The dia-
logue can become heated, however, as the next exchange shows.
The issue of trust and its limits was brought to the fore by
Meganational's lawyers.
HAL POSNER (BL): We're still thinking about this. These
partners are giving up their rights to review things.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): They're not. They're putting their
trust in us.
HAL POSNER (BL): For every one that succeeds, a few will
bomb out.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): No, doesn't happen. You've got to
know the marketplace.
Here we see the counterpoint of "rights" versus "trust and
knowledge of the marketplace." Segal was trading on the igno-
rance of the bank in this type of venture. The bank was not a fre-
quent party to real estate deals involving management. Its law-
yers, aware of this, tried to depict the issue as one of rights and
their abandonment. Segal placed his, and the market's, integrity
at stake. As we see in the next part of the meeting, his gambit
failed to draw the bank's agreement.
HAL POSNER (BL): We want the space small-2,500 square
feet.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): OK, let's say 3,000 and a three plus
three.17
HAL POSNER (BL): OK.
ROY PORTER (B): Twenty-five hundred only applies to two
tenants.
HAL POSNER (BL):I think 2,500 is appropriate.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): Let's just do three plus three.
HAL POSNER (BL): No, we want square footage too. We
want to participate in the review process. It's reason-
able.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): Yeah, reasonable. It's what the
courts want it to be.
HAL POSNER (BL): Look, it's different in California.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): Yeah, it only takes ten years to get a
building permit there. Do you want to knock out the
three plus three to 3,000?
SEYMOUR PERRY (BL): Knock out the three and three and
go to 2,800.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): I don't like it.
BILL STANLEY (D): I don't like it either.
Meganational's lawyers were afraid of granting Segal the
amount of discretion he was demanding. As a means of communi-
cating to Segal the strength of their concern, Posner invoked the
concept of "reasonableness," a commonsense approach to what was
appropriate (Geertz 1983), a way of saying that the situation entails
risk for all but there are ways we can come to agreement over
what the quantum should be. In his response Segal was dismissive
17 A three-year lease with an option to renew for a further three.
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of what he saw as a ploy,' 8 that instead of being a commonsense
notion, reasonableness was in fact a way of pulling in a legal defi-
nition. The extent to which the claim to reasonableness was suc-
cessful is summed up in Posner's statement: "Look, it's different in
California."
The final step in the discussion was how to cope with the
problem presented by the insurance company's guarantee. Failure
to pay off the guarantee would affect both parties, so both wanted
to see it resolved. And here the Meganational lawyers were deter-
mined to reduce their potential for risk.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO (TL): We have a problem with the in-
surance company where if we don't reach limit within
fifteen months, we're on the guarantee for the full
term of the loan-ten years.
HAL POSNER (BL): I hope you can change it with the in-
surance company. We've had one like this where we
couldn't get rid of the management group. So if you're
still on the guarantee, then it's because you're not do-
ing a good job. But we'd want a new manager. We
could let you approve a new manager.
ANDREW SEGAL (D): We don't like it. Our company is a
good developer with a good reputation.
HAL POSNER (BL): Once you've been burned once, you're
leery about doing it again.
At this state in the negotiations, both sides--and especially the
lawyers-were aware of the risks and uncertainties if the insur-
ance guarantee could not be satisfied. This was one element that
was essentially outside their control, and consequently Megana-
tional's lawyers were reluctant to rely on Segal's promises to over-
come any difficulties: he could not provide substantial evidence for
them to overcome the effects of "being burned."
Finally, what occurred qfter the meeting was interesting in
the context of what had been said there. Members of the Segal
group were talking among themselves when Strauss, Shapiro's as-
sociate, came into the room and announced:
PAUL STRAuss (TL): I've worse news. Our third tenant
from Strawberry Fields has just walked, after six
weeks. A franchise. I told [another associate] to start
a suit, but the tenant said he'll go bankrupt if we do.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO (TL): How big?
PAUL STRAuss (TL): Two thousand feet.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO (TL): A small tenant. It's going to
show on the list [of defaults]. 19
ANDREW SEGAL (D): I haven't told about the others.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO (TL): You mean on the list? They're
down. Andrew, we've just told them there are no de-
's The way Segal used the stretched form, "Yeah," accentuated his atti-
tude towards Meganational's lawyer's suggestions.
19 A list of defaults was promised in the course of this type of transaction.
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faults, except [X and Y]. You gotta tell them, you
gotta tell them.
Shapiro was faced with a situation where he lacked complete
knowledge of the information his client held. This is a common
problem for lawyers: for a variety of reasons clients may withhold
information. In writing about the relationship between clients and
white-collar defense attorneys Mann (1985:38) says: "Client with-
holding of information may be consistent with the best defense
strategy. Defense attorneys sometimes facilitate withholding of in-
formation .... The defense attorney is thus always concerned
with the question of whether his client is giving him all the infor-
mation he needs to know."
In one sense this is uncertainty at its most elemental. True,
the lawyer may resist hearing information as Mann suggests, but
when the lawyer is trying to obtain information and finds it with-
held, he or she faces the abyss. Incorrect information could mean
the destruction of the case. Shapiro is clear as to what Segal must
do: he must tell Meganational about the defaults, but, given Segal's
status as a major client, Shapiro cannot force him to tell. There
are both objective and normative dimensions to Shapiro's position.
What would be the result of not informing Meganational? Simi-
larly, is Shapiro under an ethical obligation to do anything? Sha-
piro's recourse in this case was to pass on the facts to Levi, who
had the authority to spell out the consequences of various actions
to Segal. Here the ambiguous position of the middle-range partner
operates to his advantage, for he shares responsibility and re-
sources with his more senior colleague. Segal eventually talked to
the insurance company and was able to persuade them to accept
the bank as a substitute for the guarantee and ultimately the deal
with Meganational was concluded.
B. Negotiating a Bank Loan
Lawyers will often simply modify an existing document rather
than draft a new one. The uncertainty of putting deals together is
reduced by relying on something that has proved successful before.
Loan agreements are a prime example of a repeated document.
They are often framed by the lender (a bank) as preparation for
negotiating a final form of the agreement. This example shows
how such a document is transformed from a unilaterally conceived
agreement into a consensual one. The document's final form is as
much a result of the interaction between the two senior lawyers
on either side of the transaction-Peter Black and Marvin Broad-
as it is a quest for the most profitable and efficient solution to
lending for maximum profit and minimal risk. These two lawyers,
who had been in practice for many years, had attended elite law
schools and knew each other well. Broad had been a partner in
two firms, both of which he helped build. He specialized in corpo-
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rate work, acting mainly as a counselor for his clients. He gener-
ally saw himself as a paterfamilias figure for his clients and col-
leagues. Black, too, was a corporate lawyer, spending much of his
time on banking affairs. Both were prominent in the community.
It is their personalities which dominate the proceedings. As they
thrust and parry, we will see how a legal instrument-a contract--
is cut up, then eventually stitched together and given new life.2°
Brian Ochre, although not a lawyer, is an accountant who has
spent his entire career with First Bank and was also intensively in-
volved in the discussions.
This example will show that lawyers engage in practical rea-
soning (Garfinkel 1967; cf. Levi 1949). That is, the process of for-
mulating a document recognizably acceptable to all the actors is an
unfolding and contingent process, which is not--as one might ex-
pect from a traditional reading of law as a "principled discipline"-
merely an explication and application of some fundamental axi-
oms. The process takes place in specific places, at specific times,
with particular people.
In this example, a large, private company (Company Ltd.)
wanted to borrow $5 million from a medium-sized bank (First
Bank).21 The negotiations extended over three meetings: in the
first two, the clients-the president, Clive Small; the senior vice-
president, Earl Long; and the chief financial officer, Frank Short-
were present; the final meeting was held between the lawyers
without their clients. These clients had retained Tischmann Wein-
stock for corporate, tax and litigation matters for more than ten
years, and the senior partner, Marvin Broad, had also been the
lawyer for the previous owners of the company. In one respect, he
was almost a godfather to the present company, having assisted
Small and Long in taking over the company from the previous
owners in a management buyout.
Broad was annoyed by what he considered to be the unneces-
sary complexity and prolixity of the proposed agreement, which
had been drafted by First Bank's lawyers. The loan agreement
opened with a two-paragraph statement describing who the parties
were and the amount to be borrowed. This opening statement was
then followed by thirty-eight single-spaced pages of terms and con-
ditions. Several pages of schedules followed the main document.
According to Broad, the other major bank he had dealt with, Sec-
ond Bank, used much shorter and simpler agreements, but he was
unable to use Second Bank for this loan.22 Though Broad pre-
20 This example will show that legal documents are not immutable ob-
jects, but are open to change and reconstruction. It will also suggest that those
who engage in business find their efforts and goals mediated in a peculiarly
esoteric way by law and lawyers.
21 For obvious reasons of confidentiality, the name of the company and
its products have been kept anonymous.
22 From my examination of other loan agreements in Tischmann Wein-
stock files, this was not, contra Broad, an extravagantly long document.
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ferred shorter agreements, he knew his chances of achieving that
in this case were slim. Broad believed a long document, whereas it
might appear to cover contingencies, would in fact create them: it
would be a local form of hyperlexis. He had discussed with his cli-
ents what they could expect from the discussions and they had
agreed to rely on whatever Broad could change for them. Ulti-
mately, they needed the loan.
A number of issues arose in the meetings that both lawyers
and clients had to resolve: Who or what was the bank lending its
money to? What were the time periods involved? How would
trademarks and jury trial waivers be determined? The resolution
of these issues was necessary for the loan to be made. One point
should be noted about the extracts of talk that follow. The action
is accomplished with an appearance of rapidity; the degree of hag-
gling is apparently low. But, as Maynard (1984:104-5) indicates,
the appearance of rapid resolution may obscure much in the way
of detailed work being done by the participants. The routine does
require work to be accomplished (Schegloff 1986).
The first meeting, held at Tischmann Weinstock's offices, was
between First Bank's representatives: an accountant from the
bank, three outside lawyers from a firm that traditionally handled
First Bank's legal work; and two lawyers from Tischmann Wein-
stock: Broad, a senior partner, and Narrow, a middle-level partner
who often worked with him on corporate matters; and the clients.
The two teams of lawyers knew each other well, having negotiated
similar matters before.
The cast is as follows:
PETER BLACK First Bank outside senior counsel
(BL=bank lawyer)
MARGARET TAUPE First Bank outside counsel (BL)
DAVID GREEN First Bank outside counsel (BL)
BRIAN OcHRE First Bank accountant
(BA=bank accountant)
CLIVE SMALL Company Ltd. president (CP)
EARL LONG Company Ltd. senior vice-president(CVP)
FRANK SHORT Company Ltd. chief financial
officer (CFO)
MARVIN BROAD Tischmann Weinstock senior
partner (TL)
RAY NARROW Tischmann Weinstock partner
(TL)
The meeting started, in a low key fashion, with a discussion
about who owned the company and about similar provisions found
in the loan agreements of other banks. Although Marvin Broad
did most of the talking for his clients, he had relied on Ray
Narrow, his junior partner, to analyze the document and brief him
on what to say. This, of course, had been done outside the purview
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of the participants in this meeting. As one of Tischmann
Weinstock's key business-getters ("rainmaker"), Broad spent most
of his time talking with clients: to do otherwise would have
adversely affected his profitability for the firm (Nelson 1988).
Even though Broad and Black had negotiated with each other
before, prior relationships, whatever they bring to current
interactions, will rarely provide the constitutive force for the
achievement of the business at hand (cf. Garfinkel 1967:94-96).
During the meeting two central issues emerged: trademarks
and waiver of jury trial. One of Company Ltd.'s most valuable
assets was its collection of trademarks, which had achieved
national recognition. Because they identified the company in the
public mind, they were of great importance to First Bank as well
as Company Ltd. But even more important to Company Ltd., as
will come out in the stretch of talk following the next, was the
possibility of losing the right of trial by jury. Broad was concerned
to keep the latter. In order to do so, he set up an elaborate but
effective procedural decoy. The importance of the trademarks is
established and then is weighed against the effect of losing the
trial by jury. Broad had also worked closely with Small in setting
up the form of the discussion over these issues. The meeting
began with the following discussion.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): Clive, you indicated you didn't like
filing trademarks as collateral.
CLIVE SMALL (CP): But if the business fails don't they get
our trademarks?
MARVIN BROAD (TL): They need an assignment if they
want to sell it. The other way is to give a negative cov-
enant that you won't sell it to anyone else.
CLIVE SMALL (CP): Yes, this company is worth more as an
entity than its pieces.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): I personally question the assign-
ment of the trademarks.
CLIVE SMALL (CP): But you're giving them the ability to
cut out the trademarks. I would rather they sell the
business.
BRIAN OCHRE (BA): But what do we do if we don't have
them?
MARVIN BROAD (TL): People do a trademark search and
they find you have done a collateral assignment that
might impugn your credibility.
BRIAN OcHRE (BA): How do we look to the inventory
without the trademarks?
MARGARET TAUPE (BL): You have the tangibles. We need
a secured interest 23 by having a filing in the Patent
and Trademark Office.
23 A secured interest is "a form of interest in property which provides
that the property may be sold on default in order to satisfy the obligation for
which the secured interest is given." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.).
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MARVIN BROAD (TL): Once we're in default yes, but what
does it do to the reputation of the company?
EARL LONG (CVP): Did it happen before?
FRANK SHORT (CFO): No, I don't know what effect it
would have.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): For the'bank it's a valuable asset.
PETER BLACK (BL): It's the asset.
EARL LONG (CVP): Would you do it if we're in default?
PETER BLACK (BL)/BRIAN OCHRE (BA) [together]: It's an
option.
BRIAN OCHRE (BA): To go back: to sell it in toto would re-
alize more.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): In bankruptcy, of course, the bank
wouldn't have priority.24 It's up to the court.
BRIAN OCHRE (BA): If we're in there selling the real es-
tate, et cetera, and the trustee in bankruptcy is selling
off the trademarks, I don't see how we're better off. I
don't like it.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): Ray, let me see the previous agree-
ment.
MARVIN BROAD (TL) [to Brian Ochre]: Did we discuss it
before?
CLIVE SMALL (CP): Why don't we put it aside and go on?
Broad started the meeting by talking directly to Small, his cli-
ent, rather than the other lawyers. It was in the nature of a side-
show, since Broad could have discussed the matter directly with
Black. But it had the effect of drawing in Ochre of First Bank, al-
lowing Broad to direct the talk initially and effectively prescribe
the agenda and so maintain control. Second, there was a tension
here over the fate of the trademarks. Without them Broad
claimed Company Ltd. was valueless: if another company were to
acquire them, it would immediately gain the prestige, and poten-
tial market, of Company Ltd. First Bank's accountant and lawyer
are convinced that the only asset worth rescuing from a dying
company would be its trademarks, hence their insistence on mak-
ing a filing with the Patent and Trademark Office. Broad offered,
though not very strongly, a countermeasure, that of giving a nega-
tive covenant-a legally binding undertaking not to do some-
thing-not to sell the trademarks to any other business or person
except First Bank. He was concerned that others in the business
world would draw the wrong inferences from First Bank's filing,
which could damage or mar Company Ltd.'s reputation as a
creditworthy business. For all of Broad's apparent concerns about
the possible loss of Company's trademarks, they were a decoy. His
main concern was a clause that excluded trial by jury in the event
of a default, which he wanted taken out. His method was to offer
a trade-the trademarks for the jury trial waiver. The trademarks
24 In bankruptcy creditors are rank ordered according to which will re-
ceive before the others.
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were seen as valuable in the eyes of First Bank and Company Ltd.,
and Broad worked to sustain and reinforce that view.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): We don't want this waiver [of trial
by jury] in the agreement.
PETER BLACK (BL): Marvin, for this to operate, you would
be in default. Then it's not the time to argue techni-
calities. If there's going to be a big fight, there'll be a
fight. It's a standard provision.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): Waiving trial by jury is not stan-
dard.
PETER BLACK (BL): It is.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): It depends what side you're on as to
whether you want a jury. In the agreement with Sec-
ond Bank it wasn't there.
PETER BLACK (BL): We don't have that agreement. You
show us that mystical agreement and let's see what
they did.
BRIAN OCHRE (BA): We've asked several times to see that
agreement.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): How many?
BRIAN OCHRE (BA): Several, and I suppose our sister bank
must have some insecurity language in there.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): No, I would never let my client
agree to such language.
BRIAN OCHRE (BA)/PETER BLACK (BL) [together]: Well,
we think of it as standard.
PETER BLACK (BL): We have to also resolve the trade-
mark issue.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): Two issues: trademarks and jury
trial.
BRIAN OCHRE (BA): I don't see, Clive, what the problem is
over the trademarks.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): The problem could come up because
trademark collateral assignments aren't that common.
Someone might do a search because they want a mark.
So how much damage, which I can't totally evaluate,
might occur?
CLIVE SMALL (CP): We'll give up the trademarks for the
jury trial.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): No. They're not interchangeable
like that.
CLIVE SMALL (CP): Which is important? Is the jury trial
important?
MARVIN BROAD (TL): Not as important as the trademarks.
It's not a legal question, it's a business one.
EARL LONG (CVP): We can give up the trademarks.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): That leaves us with the jury trial.
CLIVE SMALL (CP): I think it's a quid pro quo.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): If they're suing us for damages, we
want that protection.
BRIAN OCHRE (BA): I need to talk to Peter about this.
MARVIN BROAD (TL): Use my office.
The First Bank group left the conference room. While they
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were out, the Tischmann lawyers chatted among themselves in
and with their clients in the conference room. At one point Clive
Small said, "I don't mind giving up the trademarks." The others
returned after about five minutes and Peter Black said, "We'll give
you the jury trial waiver."
The final resolution was a trade giving up the trademark col-
lateral assignment in order to keep the right to a trial by jury.
Broad thought this a successful outcome, as did his clients.
Although Broad and Small had defended their claim on the trade-
marks as sacred, their ultimate position was that they were ex-
changeable for the protection of a jury trial. If an extreme trouble
case occurred (Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941), then with a jury trial,
Small and Long were better situated arguing before a jury rather
than a judge about the merits of their case. The possibility of re-
taining the trademarks was stronger with a jury trial than without.
As I mentioned in the introduction, the task of uncertainty man-
agement has two directions for lawyers, to reduce it for themselves
and for their clients. Broad was engaged in curtailing the prolixity
of the loan agreement while attempting, and succeeding, to protect
Small's and Long's interests in the event of a dispute with First
Bank. Here, there were significant differences in the knowledge
available to each side. The lawyers on both sides were knowledge-
able about the legal issues in constructing the loan agreement doc-
ument; the relevant issues were factual ones over which there is
potentially less control.
C. Answering Clients' Questions and "Snow Jobs"
Clients assume lawyers carry their knowledge in their heads.
This is not an unreasonable assumption for clients to make, but
lawyers are typically cautious and are hesitant about being put on
the spot. They may, however, be unable to avoid the spot, espe-
cially when a senior partner puts them there. A middle-range
partner specializing in labor law, Coyne, was called by a senior
partner, Kossof, a real estate lawyer, who had a client who owned
a plant and who wanted to know if he could compel his employees
to take polygraph tests. Kossof told Coyne that he was putting
him, himself, and the client on the same phone call at that mo-
ment so the question could be discussed by all three of them.
Coyne detested being put on the spot without some preparation,
but he could not refuse. He was in a potential double jeopardy: if
he could not produce the right answer, it might make the client
wonder why he was paying his expensive legal fees. Moreover,
Kossof would have been annoyed at Coyne and let others know of
it. As it turned out, Coyne was able to deliver a quick off-the-cuff
answer, but he backed it up by insisting that he do some research.
Kossof also reinforced the call for confirming research. Both law-
yers knew it was beneficial to them. This example, as in the sell-
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ing of the shopping mall, demonstrates the problem of the junior
lawyer who is often placed in an awkward situation by the senior
members of the firm. The solution is in the passage of time when
the junior becomes senior or for the lawyer to become a rainmaker
and so be in the position to make similar demands. Nevertheless,
even good rainmaking skills are not a complete escape from the
uncertainties of legal practice, as the next example illustrates.
Sometimes lawyers are reluctant to tell their clients, or poten-
tial clients, that they do not have the information to hand, so they
"wing it" or do a "snow job" (cf. Goffman 1952). This ability to do
snow jobs is widely admired among lawyers. its raison d'tre is
simple: Clients will never see or receive any intimation that their
lawyer is fallible. Of course such a veil cannot be held up all the
time, but it can hide errors and gaps in knowledge much of the
time. Doing a snow job can lead a lawyer to considerable lengths,
as in the example below.
The fear of losing clients is almost palpable among corporate
lawyers. Up to the 1980s law firms could rely on their clients
never to stray to another firm. Law firms, therefore, could be very
self-indulgent and engage in extensive legal research at great cost
to the client.25 The intensification of commercial competition
among clients and of the business philosophy among corporate
lawyers in the 1980s led to a move away from longstanding lawyer-
client relationships to shorter-term transactional contacts (Mac-
Donald 1989). Thus uncertainty is piled upon uncertainty: Can the
question be answered and will the client stay?
One of Tischmann Weinstock's chief securities lawyers, Daniel
Troha, was called by a lawyer in Phoenix, Jones, representing a
group of cattle-feed investors from Arizona. Troha was renowned
for his rainmaking skills. Even though he was only in his early
thirties, he was one of the major businessgetters in the firm. He
had had no warning Jones was going to call him. As the cattle-
feed investors were in Jones's office, both lawyers turned on their
squawk boxes so all the parties could speak. The investors had
started an investment program in cattle, in which they would first
solicit investors, then purchase the cattle and feed and ultimately
sell them. They expected to purchase between $1 million and $2
million worth of cattle. They had drawn up the original cattle-
feed agreement without a lawyer, however, and so the agreement
was full of mistakes. On going to see Jones in Phoenix on an an-
cillary matter, Jones told them that in his view, a variety of
problems might ensue because of the flawed agreement. Jones
knew of Troha at Tischmann Weinstock because he had heard him
25 An amusing example of the lengths to which the maxim "research and
more research" could be taken is found in John Jay Osborn's novel, The Asso-
ciates (1979).
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speak at a securities conference arranged by a national accounting
firm.
Troha knew nothing about cattle-feed investment programs
but was not going to admit it, so he said: "Let's assume, hypotheti-
cally, that I know nothing about this and you tell me all about it."
The ploy was successful and as Troha listened he discovered that
he could draw an analogy between cattle-feed investment pro-
grams and capital equipment investment so that he could make
some intelligent extempore comments. The cattle-feed investors
were unable to recognize how or why they had gone wrong. Troha
explained that since the original agreement did not meet SEC re-
quirements and the investors were not actively involved in the
buying of the cattle (a consulting expert did the actual purchas-
ing), those running the program were at risk. They had balked at
the possible cost of writing as complex a document as they thought
they would need to produce to satisfy SEC requirements. Troha ex-
plained that such a document need only run to twenty-two pages
without exhibits. Their document should be revised-which he
would do for them--and the revisions should be submitted to their
investors, offering them the right to rescind their contracts.
The investors were still unsure whether to continue with their
program now that they were in breach of the law. Troha told
them to go ahead since, because they were already in violation,
there was no reason why they should not continue. He could ex-
tract them, "with their asses," from any difficulty with the SEC; he
had just handled a comparable case with much worse facts and
brought out the clients "intact." Later Troha said that doing such
retroactive repair work "was like seeing a box of lawnmower bits
come into the office and being asked to put it back together again."
Troha constructed his solution by the process of engaging his cli-
ents in a dialogue, a dialogue in which they educated him in the
intricacies of cattle-feed investment. If he had been unable to
achieve this connection with his clients, he would have been at a
loss. Troha would have been forced to admit ignorance, which
would have stripped him of the mantle of authoritative expert in
the eyes of the clients.
In the next situation, a client bank, First State Local Bank,
asked Davidson, a corporate partner, for help with a transaction
they were conducting with an English bank involving a letter of
guarantee. U.S. banks do not issue such letters of guarantee, rely-
ing instead on standby letters of credit. Davidson had had respon-
sibility for this client-one that had been with the firm many
years-for only a short time and was quite anxious to make a good
impression on the bank. He had been a partner for about five
years, and his ambition was to become head of the corporate de-
partment in Tischmann. Besides taking on responsibility for some
large clients passed to him when another senior partner retired,
Davidson had already managed to bring in a few steady clients.
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Davidson knew nothing of letters of guarantee but wanted to hide
his ignorance in this area from First State Local. He drafted two
associates to research the issue and come up with a recognizable
letter of guarantee which he could present to the bank officers.
(The international lawyers in the firm had already been unable to
supply any answers.) It had to be done very quickly, as Davidson
did not want the bank to think that he lacked the knowledge of
the issue. Cohen, one of the associates, learned that U.S. branches
of English banks would, on notice of the issuance of a letter of
guarantee, issue in its stead a standby letter of credit. Cohen be-
Lieved this would be one way to resolve the problem. Davidson,
however, refused to accept this solution, demanding to be told
what a letter of guarantee really looked like. He was worried that
the bank might ask him what the actual letter looked like.
After more than a day of research, the associates located some
cases that had parts of such letters in them and patched together a
near facsimile of a letter of guarantee. When Davidson told the
bank what a letter of guarantee was and that it could be circum-
vented by using a branch of an English bank, First State Local de-
cided to adopt the latter course. Thus Davidson was able to extend
his knowledge base, impress the bank, and forestall any display of
ignorance at the expense of the client bank.
This instance of a snow job exemplifies Goffman's (1959) dis-
tinction between frontstage and backstage performances. For a
snow job to work, the two areas must be kept distinct; there must
be no leakage from one to the other. Davidson's ignorance was
never publicly displayed to the client and was carefully fended off
by the claim of having to research the matter. Backstage, within
the firm, ignorance is a private disability that is, on the whole, to
be collectively overcome. Sometimes snow jobs require immediate
improvisation without the respite of retreating backstage to find
new props. The case of Troha counseling the Arizonan cattle-feed
investors is one. Here he had to construct a role virtually within
the purview of the audience, his clients, developing that character
as he received cues and clues. He had no time to rehearse a script.
Most lawyers avoid such roles because the potential for making
mistakes is enormous.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have attempted to show what a certain group of lawyers--
corporate lawyers-do in their everyday activities as lawyers.
Their work is not an a priori given but is something that has to be
constructed continually, in Schon's description, by doing-in-action
with the aid of knowledge-in-action. In doing their work, corpo-
rate lawyers deal with other lawyers from within their own firms,
lawyers from other firms, and of course their clients. Coping with
the various constituencies of interests magnifies the contingent na-
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ture of their work; the interaction of lawyers with lawyers and
lawyers with clients are processes replete with uncertainty.
In my analysis of lawyers' work I have concentrated mainly on
how lawyers put deals together, a quite separate category of work
from litigation, with different expectations and motivations. The
studies of divorce lawyers (Sarat and Felstiner' 1986; Griffiths
1986), white-collar defense attorneys (Mann 1985), and personal in-
jury lawyers (Rosenthal 1974) are significant within the context of
dispute resolution-how to handle conflict already present. The
Tischmann corporate lawyers hardly ever enter a courtroom: in-
stead they think in terms of continuing negotiation. From the cor-
porate lawyer's perspective the objectively knowable external
world, referred to by Schon, is constantly shifting and unstable. It
needs to be monitored, repaired, and reconstructed continuously.
Everything is open ended. And it is for this reason that I charac-
terize corporate lawyers' work as the management of uncertainty.
The fundamental uncertainty is that the deal might collapse,
which for the lawyer might possibly mean losing the client and the
fees.26 For lawyers working on matters more focused on resolu-
tion of discrete conflicts, a satisfactory custody order may be
granted, a prosecution dismissed, or a settlement ratified. At this
point the lawyer usually withdraws from the client's life. But in
the case of the corporate lawyer, he or she often remains a con-
stant feature in the client's daily business.
The lawyer realizes also that the client's or other party's ex-
pectations might change and matters will have to be renegotiated.
Even though corporate lawyers seek certainty for their clients,
they know it is really a chimera. This feature, too, distinguishes
the management of uncertainty from problem solving. Inherent in
the idea of problem solving is that there is a solution, some form of
answer that closes the process. There may be answers of a sort,
but they are at best merely short term. Salacuse (1988:347), for ex-
ample, puts this way:
The challenge of international business negotiations is not
just "getting to yes," but staying there. International busi-
ness agreements, solemnly signed and sealed after hard
bargaining, seem to break down frequently, bringing the
parties back to the negotiating table. Indeed, many inter-
national business negotiations are in reality renegotiations
of preexisting agreements.
The examples I have presented also illuminate the relation-
ship between lawyer and client. The most basic question was that
put by Rosenthal (1974): Who's in charge? In the general case of
the personal plight lawyer, the question is an apposite one. The
evidence from studies of these lawyers suggests strongly that law-
yers expend considerable energy in maintaining control over their
26 Cf. Gilson (1984), who argues that business lawyers enhance the value
of transactions.
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clients (Hosticka 1979). Business lawyers, however, are more in
the thrall of their clients, according to Heinz and Laumann (1982).
In part this is correct: The example of Segal and Shapiro shows
the client firmly taking command of the proceedings. In the ex-
amples of Broad and Small, Troha and the cattle-feed investors,
and Davidson and the First State Local Bank, the division of au-
thority is less clear. It might be more reasonable to speak of col-
laboration between lawyer and client towards ends that are open
textured rather brought to natural closure. For example, both
Broad and Small in the bank loan example work together in
presenting the issues of the trademarks and the exclusion of trial
by jury. Step by step, utterance by utterance, they construct their
case. Troha, too, works with his potential clients to arrive at a
range of possible answers. Again the motif of collaboration is pres-
ent.
An element that complicates the lawyer-client relationship is
when the lawyer doing the actual work is not the one who "owns"
the client in the firm. This was very much the case with Shapiro,
who could not influence a client like Segal in the same way his
mentor Levi could. Once the lawyer-client relationship is placed
in the context of the law firm as an organization, we cannot look
at the relationship as a simple dyad. It is much more. Who does
what and how becomes part of the politics of the firm. For exam-
ple, within Tischmann Weinstock 41 percent of the firm's corpo-
rate clients were controlled by six lawyers, which means these six
partners distribute a large amount of work throughout the firm.
The potential, then, for patronage within the law firm is enor-
mous, thus creating highly ambiguous situations for the lawyers
working for their patrons. The "underlaborers" are pulled two
ways simultaneously at least-to the client and to their patron.
The problem for the underlaborer is that he or she has to satisfy
both constituencies, which may not always be possible. For exam-
ple, a client asked an associate to interrupt his senior partner dur-
ing a series of questions because the partner had omitted some-
thing of importance. The partner responded as asked but
afterwards berated the associate for his impertinence in interrupt-
ing him.
Lawyers' knowledge is different in kind from that of natural
scientists, who can appeal to the canons of scientific method and
replication of experiments (Barnes 1985).27 The results of lawyers'
work depends on the interactions with others as much as, if not
more than, the knowledge they find in texts. All the endeavors
described and analyzed in this paper were ultimately social con-
structions--e.g., Broad worked with Small and Black; Troha
27 There is now evidence to show that even scientific work is dependent
on an interactional infrastructure and that its objective methods cannot be
taken for granted (Lynch 1985).
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worked with his clients; Davidson collaborated with his associates.
Norms, unlike objective phenomena (and this is highly contesta-
ble), are pure human constructs, out of which it is virtually impos-
sible to derive general laws. The work of lawyers is founded on
interaction. Negotiating, drafting, and advising all depend on an
interactional context for their fulfillment, no matter how mun-
dane the matter may be. Even the changing of the work "substan-
tial" for "material" is not something that can occur in isolation.
Within each of the spheres of negotiation, drafting, and advising
lawyers have developed practices for their accomplishment. These
practices are what Schon calls knowledge-in-action. That is, theo-
retical knowledge will only help partially; it is the knowledge that
comes from the doing of the work which is crucial to normatively
based professions. It is in the very activity of negotiating a deal
that the deal comes to be.
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